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Political knowledge is not the same as historical knowledge; but especially since the search for analogies is so much part of political argument, more historical knowledge can at least sometimes prevent political misjudgement. Yet this process is less straightforward than is often assumed; if anything, James Bryce was right when he claimed that 'the chief practical use of history is to deliver us from plausible historical analogies'. One of my purposes in this essay is to make us think harder about historical analogies; but its overall point is not that certain strands of liberalism in the past cannot speak to us at all. However, to make the voices of the thinkers I examine in these pages heard properly -and understand what they might tell us --we also need a much better sense of what they actually said and what they stood for.
Raymond Aron, Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper --these names are often subsumed under the rubric 'Cold War liberalism', a rubric that's a term of abuse more often than not. 2 Paradoxically, however, it is in fact the outcome of the Cold War that 3 has vindicated them -and at the same time contributed to a systematic forgetting of what they actually said and meant. In the same vein, these thinkers have often been labelled 'conservative liberals'; yet this label itself explains little, unless we specify in some way where liberalism ends and where conservatism begins. Lately, one of them -Berlin -has even been placed in the tradition of anti-rationalist CounterEnlightenment thought. 3 Clearly, the meaning of their legacy is far from settled. 4 
A Liberalism of Fear: Between Sentiments and Ideas
We fear a society of fearful people.
Judith Shklar
There is a an apparent paradox in the intellectual history of the mid-twentieth-century:
on the one hand, the supposed heyday of 'Cold War liberalism', the 1950s, saw an intense struggle over ideas -today one might be inclined to say 'a war of ideas'. As Lionel Trilling put it in 1950, 'what gods were to the ancients at war, ideas are to us'. Historicism -in the sense of relativism --and positivism paved the way for such a collapse, as they only left subjective 'value-judgements' as the basis of prodemocratic attitudes. As Voegelin put it, 'when the episteme is ruined, men do not stop talking about politics; but they now must express themselves in the mode of doxa'. 21 Consequently, the advocates of classical political knowledge sought a 'rebirth of classical rationalism'. That classical rationalism -or the proper source of political knowledge -was to be found before the fall of modern politics. In Strauss's thought, that fall had occurred with the turn away from a concentration on virtue as the precondition of the good polity; instead of pursuing virtue, the moderns had followed
Hobbes' attempt to ground a commonwealth in individual self-interest. For Voegelin, on the other hand, the fall was caused by the triumph in the modern world of what he called 'Gnosticism' -the comprehensive 're-divinization' of society and the quest for 'eschatological fulfilment' in a terrestrial paradise, which came to characterize a variety of modern intellectual movements and, eventually, 'modernity' as a whole.
In the end, both Strauss and Voegelin were moral cognitivists, Strauss's apparently zetetic approach notwithstanding. Truth existed and it could be known; the moderns had not only lost such knowledge, they had even lost the capacity to pose the right questions about it. In other words, recovering a proper politics was a matter of recovering the right questions, and, ultimately, the right knowledge -in principle episteme politiké was attainable. This call for a return to certainty based on firm reason or even revelation was sounded numerous times in the immediate post-war period. Waldemar Gurian, for instance, another German exile, argued in 1952 that the pseudo-certainty of totalitarianism which establishes by terror and a refined system of pressure a closed pseudo-real world can be opposed only by the true certainty based upon belief in true revelation and by the realization that man is infinitely more than an instrument for life and society in this world, that there are rights and duties of the human person which cannot be sacrificed to a doctrine about political and social development. 22 The liberals, no less than the searchers for certainty, engaged in what one might call a 'politics of knowledge'; in fact they based their conception of political action directly on epistemological claims. Yet, neither had they faith in positivism, nor did they hope to achieve secure political knowledge by returning to an unsullied classical past, where the most important questions could be posed afresh -and least of all did they think that revelation could serve as a ground for moral and political certainty.
Rather, many of their arguments in favour of liberalism were based on what one might call, broadly speaking, social and historical epistemology, as well as philosophies of science. Raymond Aron's first major work presented an argument about the limits of historical objectivity; in fact, Aron's entire intellectual trajectory was informed by the moment he described movingly in his lectures on the philosophy of history and then again in his autobiography: wandering along the Rhine in 1932, apparently in a moment of existential anguish, he asked himself how understanding the historical moment one was living through was possible at all. 23 Popper first elaborated a view of all human knowledge as fallible, which then had direct consequences for his political thought; Berlin, finally, taking inspiration not least from the romantic liberals of the nineteenth century, insisted that history had 'no libretto', and that values could not be chosen against the background of some absolute moral or historical certainty; they could also not claim universality. 24 One might say then that, paradoxically, the liberals sought a kind of certainty about uncertainty, or perhaps a certainty about unpredictability -Manès Sperber, describing Aron's thought, once spoke of a 'certitude des incertitudes'. 25 In that sense, they provided a quasi-scientific, but not an in any way 'rationalist' foundation for liberal politics. Ends and means could never be perfectly matched, and neither was there a depository of unchanging moral truth about politics. In other words, they rejected both the 'instrumental rationality' as well as the behaviourism of the social scientists, and the 'classical rationalism' of Strauss and Voegelin. Political knowledge was not unobtainable, but it could never have the kind of certainty that the social scientific and the philosophical rationalists were hoping for it. There was no sure form of inductive knowledge that might be gained from observing the apparent regularities of the social and political world; and neither could the best regime be deduced from an unchanging 'human nature', as the proponents of classical political knowledge would have had it. There was only certainty about uncertainty. responsibility. 28 In particular, they all one way or another accepted the idea of value pluralism -and sometimes even indulged in the existentialist pathos that is often associated with value pluralism. This was most obvious in Berlin's case, whose entire intellectual universe turned on his insight into value pluralism (which he sometimes believed he had been the first to discover).
But it was also true of Popper and Aron. Popper believed that one would always live in an imperfect society, because 'there always exist irresolvable clashes of values: there are many moral problems which are insoluble because moral principles may conflict' -and in fact Popper at one point claimed intellectual copyright for value pluralism as well. 29 He also argued emphatically that 'whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because without reasoning he has adopted some decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called Freiburg School and some of Hayek's disciples in the US. 47 Berlin, Aron and Popper, on the other hand, never advocated such forms of compensation; their advocacy of liberty was not accompanied by a basso continuo of cultural pessimism, or a longing for the certainties of revelation or some supposedly incontestable philosophical anthropology. 48 In many ways, they had more trust in individual human beings, and were more ready to place a bet on humanity, than the libertarians who drew on None of the thinkers in question here left a systematic work of political theory.
Their thought was, as Aron put it, 'impure' -meaning: historical, shaped by circumstances and by particular challenges. 54 They tended to respond most strongly to the political passions of others, rebutting, reworking or reorienting the positions of antiliberals, rather than remaining faithful to an already established legacy of liberal thought. Their thinking, in any case, was more occupied with liberalization than with liberalism. 55 And their call for moderation resonated in a world dominated by political passions; they did not speak against the background of a fully worked-out philosophy of moderation. Pas trop de zèle was a question of attitude, rather than any kind of analytical philosophical 'demonstration' -which no doubt explained why some of those who grew up in the middle of the spring and summer of Rawlsian liberalism found it not obviously worthwhile to engage them.
Conflict was the starting point of their political thought; and pluralism was both a problem and a condition to be preserved. 56 
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14 The main stylization is, arguably, a tendency to 'Berlinize' Aron and Popper in particular. I think a good case can be made that Aron stood not just in the tradition of the 'Anglo-Saxon school' of political and social thought in France, as has often been remarked, but was also a descendant of the French moralists (and therefore a certain kind of sceptic and a psychologist); Popper, on the other hand, was much closer to a confidence in social science and even technocracy that was profoundly alien to Berlin.
I should also say that of course the three protagonists of my story knew each to varying degrees --but for the most part, they did not see each other as particularly close allies, even if they would have recognized as engaged in the same 'war of ideas'. Also, they did not see each other as engaged in the same kind of intellectual, University of Chicago Press, 1993). 18 My presentation of Strauss and Voegelin, I hasten to admit, is of course rather crude and reductionist. It serves as a contrast to the 'liberalism of fear' as another possible response to the cataclysms of the twentieth century; in no way does it justice to the complexity and subtlety of these thinkers -which even their most severe critics have to acknowledge. In particular, I largely leave out the zetetic dimension of Strauss's thought, his attempt to regain the very possibility of philosophizing; and I drastically simplify Voegelin's epic historical diagnosis of modernity -which, one might argue, in certain respects runs parallel to some of the narratives and psychological diagnoses offered by the liberals: After all, for Voegelin, Gnosticism also originated in a 'drive for certainty' as a response to the 'anxiety' induced by
